Süre                : 2 Saat 5 dakika
Çıkış Tarihi     : 24 Aralık 1969 Çarşamba, Yapım Yılı : 1969
Türü                : Drama,Romantik
Ülke                : ABD
Yapımcı          :  Athena Productions
Yönetmen       : Elia Kazan (IMDB)(ekşi)
Senarist          : Elia Kazan (IMDB)(ekşi),Elia Kazan (IMDB)(ekşi)
Oyuncular      : Kirk Douglas (IMDB)(ekşi), Faye Dunaway (IMDB)(ekşi), Deborah Kerr (IMDB), Richard Boone (IMDB)(ekşi), Hume Cronyn (IMDB)(ekşi), Michael Higgins (IMDB)(ekşi), Carol Eve Rossen (IMDB)(ekşi), William Hansen (IMDB)(ekşi), Harold Gould (IMDB), Michael Murphy (IMDB), John Randolph Jones (IMDB), Anne Hegira (IMDB), Charles Drake (IMDB), E.J. André (IMDB), Philip Bourneuf (IMDB), Dianne Hull (IMDB), Donna Anders (IMDB), Brian Andrews (IMDB), David Barton (IMDB), Julia Black (IMDB), Steve Bond (IMDB), Betty Bresler (IMDB), Helen Bruno (IMDB), Dee Carroll (IMDB), Stephen Coit (IMDB), Bob Collis (IMDB), Bert Conway (IMDB), Francis De Sales (IMDB), Ann Doran (IMDB), Trent Gough (IMDB), Raymond Guth (IMDB), James Halferty (IMDB), Harry Hauss (IMDB), Clint Kimbrough (IMDB), Dorothy Konrad (IMDB), John Lawrence (IMDB), Maureen McCormick (IMDB), Philo McCullough (IMDB), Al McGranary (IMDB), Valerie Miller (IMDB) >>devamı>>

The Arrangement (~ Kader degismez) ' Filminin Konusu :
The Arrangement is a movie starring Kirk Douglas, Faye Dunaway, and Deborah Kerr. A suicidal advertising executive is forced to re-evaluate his life while dealing with his unhappy marriage, his mistress, and his aging father.





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    structured products denilen karmaşık türev araçlar hakkında kitapları olan, türev araçlarda en bilgili kişilerden biri.

    efsfnin krizi neden çözemeyeceğini ft'de yazmış.

    http://www.ft.com/…-00144feab49a.html#axzz1azoq63p3

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    if, as albert einstein observed, insanity is “doing the same thing over and over again and expecting different results”, then one of the latest proposals for resolving the eurozone debt crisis requires psychiatric rather than financial assessment.

    one idea entails a restructuring of greek debt with possible writedowns of about 50 per cent and recapitalisation of the affected banks. the european financial stability facility would increase its size , potentially enabling the fund to inject capital into banks and also support spain and italy’s financing needs to reduce further contagion risks.

    this could involve the use of leverage to increase the efsf’s size and enhance its ability to intervene effectively. under such a plan, the fund would apparently bear the first 20 per cent of losses on sovereign bonds and perhaps its investment in banks. this resembles the equity tranche in a collateralised debt obligation, which assumes the risk of the initial losses on loans or bond portfolios. under such a plan, assuming the efsf contributes €400bn, the total bail-out resources would be about €2,000bn. higher leverage, a lower first loss piece of, say, 10 per cent, would increase available funds to €4,000bn. under this mooted plan, the european central bank would supply the “protected” debt component to leverage the efsf’s contribution, bearing losses only above the first loss piece size.

    reputedly based on suggestion from tim geithner, the us treasury secretary, such a plan has a number of problems.

    the efsf does not have €440bn. after existing commitments to greece, ireland and portugal, its theoretical resources are at best about €250bn, assuming that the increase to €440bn is ratified by european parliaments.

    the efsf must borrow money from the markets, relying on its own cdo-like structure, backed by a cash first loss cushion and guarantees from eurozone countries. in fact, some investors actually value and analyse efsf bonds as a type of highly rated cdo security known as a super senior tranche. this means that the arrangement outlined above would have features of a cdo of a cdo (cdo²), a highly leveraged security which proved toxic in 2007-08.

    the ecb, the provider of protected debt, has capital of about €5bn, supporting about €140bn in bonds issued by beleaguered eurozone nations, purchased as part of market operations to reduce their borrowing costs. the ecb has also lent substantial sums (market estimates suggest more than €400bn) to european banks without access to money markets at acceptable cost, secured over similar bonds. while the eurozone central banking system has capital of about €80bn that could be available to support the ecb’s operations, this adds to the incremental leverage under such a plan.

    a 20 per cent first loss position may be too low. unlike typical diversified cdo portfolios, the highly concentrated nature of the underlying investments (distressed sovereign debt and equity in distressed banks exposed to the very same sovereigns) and the high default correlation (reflecting the interrelated nature of the exposures) means potential losses could be much higher. actual losses in sovereign debt restructuring are also variable and could be as high as 75 per cent of the face value of bonds.

    the circular nature of the idea is surreal. highly leveraged vehicles, in part backed by weakened nations such as spain and italy, would undertake the “rescue” of the same countries and their banks. this would be akin to an entity selling insurance against its own default. this would only work if all commitments were fully backed by real cash and savings, which of course nobody actually has.

    the proposal assumes that it would not need to be used, avoiding exposing its technical shortcomings. the efsf, too, was never meant to be used, relying on the “shock and awe” of the proposal, especially its size and government backing, to resolve the crisis.

    the idea is driven, in reality, by political imperatives – avoiding seeking national parliamentary approval when sentiment is against bail-outs and lack of support for an increase in the size and scope of the efsf. it is also designed to reduce risk to the credit ratings of france and germany. it might facilitate the ecb covertly monetising debt, “printing money”, to generate the protected debt to leverage the structure and to cover the losses on its own exposures to distressed sovereign debt.

    any such scheme is unlikely to succeed. as sigmund freud observed: “illusions commend themselves to us because they save us pain and allow us to enjoy pleasure instead. we must therefore accept it without complaint when they sometimes collide with a bit of reality against which they are dashed to pieces.”

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    (vrizas - 12 Ekim 2011 15:44)

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