Late Life: The Chien-Ming Wang Story (~ Hou Jing: Wang Chien-Ming) ' Filminin Konusu : Late Life: The Chien-Ming Wang Story is a movie starring Chien-ming Wang, Neil Allen, and Brian Cashman. The first and only Taiwanese player for the New York Yankees, Chien-Ming Wang held many titles: American League Wins Leader,...
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12 ekim 1891 ile 16 aralık 1945 tarihleri arasında yaşamış siyaset adamı ve başbakan.ailesi imparator naipliği ve yüksek devlet görevlerini elinde tutan beş büyük japon ailesinin en güçlüsüydü. babası atsumaro da ünlü bir devlet adamıydı. tokyo imparatorluk üniversitesi'nde, ardından kyoto imparatorluk üniversitesi'nde ülkenin seçkin gençleriyle birlikte öğrenim gördü. japonya'nın i. dünya savaşı'na katıldığı dönemde hukuk fakültesini bitirdi. öğrencilik yıllarında batı felsefesi, edebiyatı ve sosyolojisinin yanı sıra batı'nın toplumsal ve ekonomik sorunlarını yakından öğrendi. konoe, bu dönemde oscar wilde'ın 1891'de yazdığı the soul of man under socialism (sosyalizmde insanın ruhu) adlı makalesini japoncaya çevirdi. makale bir dergi de yayımlandıysa da, hükümet kamu düzeni açısından tehlikeli olduğu gerekçesiyle derginin satışını yasakladı.parlamenter yönetimin açık savunucularından, saray soylusu ve yaşlı devlet adamı saionci kimmoçi'nin koruması altında siyasal yaşama giren konoe, paris barış konferansı'na (1919) katılan japon heyetinde yer aldı. bu sırada yazdığı bir makalede, geniş nüfuz alanları bulunan ülkelerin çıkarlarını korumaya yönelik olduğu gerekçesiyle angloamerikan barış önerilerine karşı çıktı. ayrıca, iktisadi emperyalizmi ve ırkçı önyargıları ortadan kaldırmayı amaçlayan uluslararası bir örgütün oluşturulamayacağını savunarak bu yöndeki girişimleri şiddetle eleştirdi. daha sonra prens unvanından dolayı girdiği soylular meclisi'nde, meclisin yapısında ve soyluluk düzeninde reform yapılmasını savundu. faşizme karşı çıktı ve ordunun dışişlerine karışmasını önelemek amacıyla genelkurmayın yeniden düzenlenmesini istedi. parlamenter siyasal yapının güçlendirilmesine yönelik bir mücadele yürüttü. mançurya'da çin'e karşı başlatılan (1931) savaşın olası sonuçlarını önceden görerek, siyaset adamlarının japon ordu mekanizmasını bütünüyle değiştirmeleri gerektiğini vurguladı. soylular meclisi'nde bir süre başkan yardımcılığı yaptıktan sonra, 1933'te başkanlığa atandı.sainoci'nin tavsiyesi üzerine imparatorun 1936'da kendisine önerdiği başbakanlık görevini önce geri çevirdiyse de, haziran 1937'de bütün ulusun desteğini kazanmayı hedefleyen partiler üstü bir kabine oluşturmayı kabul etti. ordunun ılımlı bazı isteklerini yerine getirirken, aşırı eğilimli subayları denetim altında tutmaya çalıştı. uluslararası sorunları hakkaniyet kurallarına göre çözmeyi ve içerideki sürtüşme ve uzlaşmazlıkları gidermeyi amaçlayan bir program benimsedi.temmuz'da çin ve japon birliklerinin pekin yakınlarında giriştiği çarğışmanın ardından, iki ülke arasında açıkça ilan edilmeyen geniş çaplı bir savaş başladı. çatışmayı durdurmaya yönelik çeşitli girişimlerden sonuç alamayan konoe, ocak 1939'da başbakanlıktan çekilmek zorunda kaldı. daha sonra özel danışma kurulu'nun başkanlığına atandı, ayrıca hiranuma kiiçiro'nun kabinesinde görev aldı.konoe'nin ilk kabinesini uğraştıran ana konulardan biri hükümetle ordu arasındaki yetki uyuşmazlığı olmuştu. ordunun denetim altına alınması ve savaşın sonuçlandırılması için ülke düzeyinde örgütlü siyasi bir güce dayanacak bir hükümetin gerektiğini gören konoe, bu nitelikte bir kitle hareketi geliştirmek amacıyla haziran 1940'ta özel danışma kurulu başkanlığından istifa etti. ama planını tam olarak gerçekleştiremeden ikinci kez başbakanlığa atandı. halkın desteklediği, kitlesel bir örgüt tasarısı ise aynı yıl içinde imparatorluk yönetimine yardım birliği'nin kurulmasıyla gerçekleşti.japonya eylül 1940'ta almanya ve italya ile üçlü pakt adıyla askeri bir ittifak oluşturdu. konoe birleşik krallık ve abd ile ilişkilerin gittikçe bozulduğu bir ortamda, çin-japon çatışmasının genişlemesini ve abd'nin savaşa katılmasını önelemeye çalıştı. nisan 1941'de de sscb ile bir saldırmazlık antlaşması imzaladı. japon-abd ilişkilerinin daha da bozulması ve japonya'nın abd tarafından kuşatılması üzerine, çin-japon çatışmasını ancak abd'nin arabuluculuğuyla çözülebileceği sonucuna vardı. bu nedenle nisan 1941'den başlayarak bütün ağırlığını japon-abd görüşmelerine verdi ve abd başkanı franklin d. roosevelt'le görüşebilmenin yollarını aradı. bu görüşmelere karşı çıkan dışişleri bakanı matsuoka yosuke'yi hükümet dışında bırakmak amacıyla temmuzda üçüncü kabinesini kurdu. ama savaş bakanı hideki tojo ile beliren görüş ayrılıkları yüzünden ekimde istifa etti.aralık 1941'de japonya'nın pearl harbor'a yaptığı baskının ardından savaşın genişlemesiyle gözetim altına alınan konoe, etkin siyasetten uzaklaşmaya zorlandı. 1944'te toco hükümetini düşürmek amacıyla önde gelen başka siyaset adamlarıyla işbirliğine girişti. savaştan sonra, 1945'te higaşikuni hükümetinde içişleri bakanı yardımcısı oldu. aynı yıl savaş suçlusu olduğu iddiasıyla abd işgal kuvvetlerince hakkında tutuklama kararı alındı. ifade vereceği gün olan 16 aralık'ta zehir içerek intihar etti.
(meth - 28 Temmuz 2011 23:39)
japonya'yı ikinci dünya savaşına sokan ve bu sebeple japonlar tarafından en kötü anılan eski japonya başbakanı. hideki tojo'den bile bu kadar nefret etmiyorlar.
(aimo - 16 Eylül 2017 23:14)
fumimaro konoe and the sino-japanese war silinir milinir, ilistireyim suraya:--- spoiler ---ı.on june 4, 1937, prime minister fumimaro konoe created his firstcabinet to succeed that of senjuro hayashi. fumimaro konoe’s backgroundas a member of a noble clan close to the japanese imperial family madehim a strong favorite of genro kinmochi saionji. konoe, 46 years old,made a young, handsome prime minister. he projected a fresh, rational, anddynamic image, and was liked by the military, political parties of both theleft and the right, and the japanese populace as well.on the day he created his cabinet, konoe announced his wish tolessen internal discord and friction. he vowed to promote internationalrighteousness and social justice in his tenure . a year earlier as a matter offact, after the 2-26 ıncident , the saionji petitioned the emperor to askkonoe to form a cabinet, but he turned it down, citing health reasons. ayear later, he had no choice but to accept the appointment, despite hisunwillingness to assume the post of the prime minister .konoe later wrote in his diary:“basically, ı know which directionthe japanese nation should go. ı’ll do my best to insist on that road. toachieve this, it is necessary to suppress the aggressive and irrationalmilitary sector. but ı will listen to their petitions so long as they arereasonable.” this shows that at that time, the military had already become aheadache for the japanese people.a month and three days after his inauguration as prime minister, themarco polo bridge ıncident occurred, an event which later triggered thepacific war and eventually led to japan’s defeat. ın this paper, acomprehensive narrative of fumimaro konoe’s involvement in thesino-japanese war will be made, especially his role in the war and itssignificance.ıı.on the evening of july 7, a company of japanese soldiers were takingdrills near the marco polo bridge. after the exercises, as they prepared toreturn to their barracks, they were fired upon. a roll call showed that one 18 soldier went missing. a report was sent to their superiors. soon, coloneltakuro matsui, director of ıntelligence stationed in peiping, made a phonecall to takutaro sakurai, adviser to the hopei political affairs commission.the latter met in person with general chien, teh-chun, commissioner ofthe hopei political affairs commission and vice commander of the 29thcorps. ıt was agreed that both sides refrain from further complicating theincident.news about the incident reached the japanese central government earlymorning of the following day. a meeting attended by representatives fromthe army ministry, the foreign ministry, and the navy ministry decided“not to further complicate matters and to resolve the issue quickly throughlocal negotiations.” furthermore, directives were given to the japanesearmy stationed in tienjin.the konoe cabinet convened a provisional meeting on the morning ofjuly 9, during which it decided to support the army ministry’s position notto blow up the matter. ın reality, however, the war was getting worse. onthis issue, konoe later said:as the china incident was erupting, my cabinet, as well as the army,advocated not to make matters worse. but things went the other way. ıtcontinued to escalate….ı (later) asked kanji ıshihara, the director ofmilitary operations, why despite his support for this principle, as well asgovernment backing for it, the situation still went out of hand? ıshihararesponded: we were fooled by those who had voiced support but secretlyplanned for an escalation of the situation. these people cooked up theirplans in the army and in the troubled location itself. at least, thechief-of-staff agreed to support the resolution, but ministers hajimesugiyama and yoshiziro umezu of the army ministry were ambivalent.the governor-general of korea, general jiro minami, and the commanderofficer in korea, general koiso kuniaki, even publicly called for thegovernment to “do it to the very end” in their written proposals. for thisreason, conflicts of opinion often occurred in upper-echelon government fumimaro konoe and the sino-japanese war 19meetings.according to konoe’s experience, the reason why the marco polobridge ıncident grew worse was the rift between the military and thegovernment. the government couldn’t take a hand in military affairs, muchless intervene with military directives. ın turn, the army ministry could notimpose control on the local army. for this, konoe said with regret:“ınsteadof saying that the cabinet exercises no control over the military(constitutionally, the cabinet and the supreme command are totallyindependent of one another), it would be more fitting to say that the armyleaders exercise no power over the army itself. ”because the prime minister was kept in the dark on the status of the warand its motives, he could not properly set his diplomatic and fiscal policies.he wrote the emperor for help, requesting that the cabinet be informedbeforehand on matters handled by the supreme command. the emperorresponded saying that the military refused to discuss war matters in acabinet meeting attended by ministers from various political parties. ınstead,the emperor would relay information to the prime minister and the foreignminister, but they could only listen without giving any opinion.fumimaro konoe ardently wished for an early solution to the marcopolo bridge ıncident. he even tried kanji ıshihara’s suggestion topersonally meet with chiang kai-shek in nanking for a political solution ofthe issue.ın his notes, konoe writes: not long after the marco polo bridgeıncident, ı recall secretary ting of ambassador chiang tsuo-pin’s officetold me to contact ryusuke miyazaki and teisuke akiyama if there wassomething to discuss. without a personal meeting with chiang kai-shek,we could not prevent further deterioration of the situation. ı got in touchwith akiyama and it was decided that we send miyazaki. we obtainedpermission from the army minister, general sugiyama, and quicklydispatched miyazaki to nanking. but before he could board the ship inkobe, miyazaki was seized by the military police. akiyama, too, was 20 «?????»????????arrested. conditions became complicated. when asked why the militarypolice acted to disrupt the plan he previously approved of, generalsugiyama answered evasively. from this, it is evident that konoe wasgenuinely interested in resolving the conflict with the nationalistgovernment. meanwhile, the military headquarter’s chief-of-staff had setplans to send 15 divisions to china from mid july to mid-august, and hadset a budget of 2.5 to 3 billion yen for the operations. ın fact, by the end ofseptember, japanese forces in china had reached the equivalent of 15divisions.japan’s attack on china was conducted on three fronts: ınner mongolia,northern china and southern china. the kanto army took control of ınnermongolia and later established the mongolia-sinkiang administration. thenorthern china army conquered hopei, shanhsi and shantung, thenestablished the “republic of china provisional government” (with wangke-min as leader). ın central china, with shanghai as focal point, threedivisions were mobilized, but strong resistance from the chinese army ledto massive losses. three more divisions were dispatched from northernchina to form the 10th army, which landed in the gulf of hangchou. thiswas joined by the 16th division sent to shanghai from northern china andwhich landed at the lower reaches of the yangtze near paimaokou.gradually, the chinese line of resistance collapsed, followed by a fullretreat. the nationalist government slowly moved inland to the wuhancities and chungking.actually, the japanese government, especially in terms of how konoehandled the matter, bore the greatest responsibility when it came to japan’sinvasion of china and the war’s subsequent deterioration. on july 11, thefive major ministers met with the cabinet to decide what war strategy toadopt. from dusk of july 11, konoe called representatives from the diet,the nobility, important figures in the finance industry, and the mass mediafor consultation in his official residence. he personally announced thejapanese government’s decision. two days later on july 13, konoe invited fumimaro konoe and the sino-japanese war 21representatives from the industrial sector and major magazine publishers fora meeting, requesting their full support. soon, japanese dailies wereblustering about the chastisement of china, thus giving the hardliners theupper hand. this played a role in the irreversible deterioration of thesituation. no wonder, mamoru shigemitsu, a former foreign minister,labled konoe as “a most suitable puppet of the military.” he was “just anofficial who adapted his ways to the changing times.” ıtaro ıshii, who wasthen director of the east asia bureau of the japanese foreign ministry, hadthe following view of konoe: “he knew how to tell the good from the bad,but lacked the courage to choose what is good. he always gave in toexternal pressure. that’s why the hardliners gained the upperhand in thesino-japanese conflict, which went on and on. he was disloyal to his ownprinciples. having a person like that as prime minister in a crisis period,what would you expect ?” “prince konoe was just too superficial.”ııı.as the japanese continued their relentless attack on the chinesemainland, the british, who enjoyed great power in china, attempted tobroker peace between the two countries. but the japanese army rejected theidea. ınstead, the germans, through osker paul trautmann(1877-1950)acted as intermediary for talks towards ending the war.on november 2, the japanese foreign minister, kooki hirota, firstmade a peace proposal through the german ambassador to japan, herbertvon dirksen (1882-1955). trautmann, the german ambassador to china,received a copy of the proposal from von dirksen. on november 5, herelayed the terms of the japanese on two conditions: (1) the germans mustmediate to the very end, and (2) japanese administrative sovereignty innorthern china must be maintained.the japanese, however, seeing that they had the upperhand in the war,and in fact, were planning to capture nanking, added more preconditions.dirksen was informed of the additional conditions on december 22.trautmann relayed the message to the chinese government on december 22 «?????»????????26, hoping that the nationalist government could respond before the fifthor sixth of january in the new year. the japanese government and itsmilitary celebrated the new year in good spirits, anticipating good newsfrom the chinese. on january 13, the chinese rather than give a formalresponse, made contact to inquire about concrete details of the japanesedemands. the japanese took that as a delaying tactic adopted by thechinese who had no real desire to negotiate. on january 16, theirdeclaration to the chinese inquiry was “no. we will never again deal withthe nationalist government. "people in japan, including the former prime minister, reijirowakatsuki, criticized the japanese declaration. konoe, in fact, knew thatthe declaration was a blunder. ın his notes, konoe write: evidently, thisdeclaration was a big mistake. ı personally accept that it was a failure. torectify the mistake of having made this declaration, ı tried to resume ourrelations with chungking. we used various means, but to no avail…the cabinet was re-organized on may 26 and a declaration called“new order”was made on november 3 as a way to rectify the previousdeclaration refusing to deal with the nationalist government. konoe gaveorders to the new foreign minister, kazushige ugaki, to do everythingpossible to abolish the said declaration. considering the new declarationan insult, the nationalist government became even more resolute in itsstruggle against the japanese. there is no question about that.ın the new cabinet, most of the attention was given to the position ofarmy minister. konoe was not on good terms with hajime sugiyama, theformer army minister. ıt was generally considered that replacing sugiyamawas crucial to the solution of the sino-japanese conflict. with much effort,konoe finally succeeded in appointing seishiro ıtagaki, then commander ofthe fifth division stationed in the hsuchou front. konoe thought thatıtagaki was against further deterioration of the conflict. little did he knowthat ıtagaki, too, was a puppet, much like sugiyama was. he listened to hissubordinates, a fact that later greatly disappointed the prime minister. fumimaro konoe and the sino-japanese war 23ıt turned out that konoe had no idea about ıtagaki’s thinking andpersonality. ın appointing ıtagaki as army minister, konoe was merelyswayed by the man’s reputation and by rumors he heard about him. he wastherefore very disappointed when they personally met to discuss matters.on the third day of the meetings, the secretary of the interior minister,koohei mastsudaira made the following comments to kumao harada, thensecretary of saionji: “this is confidential, but his majesty told the ınteriorminister that ‘konoe told him he had met with ıtagaki, and he realized thatıtagaki was stupid.’ he also laughingly said that ‘konoe will changesoon.’”ın fact, after ıtagaki assumed his post, the war in china turned for theworse. the japanese attacked hankow and canton. on this, konoe writesin his diary: “ı have the vaguest idea where opinion in the army reallycomes from. the cabinet is kept in the dark by a marshall who has yet toshow his true colors.” he told people that he “no longer wishes to continueacting as a puppet.”konoe, desperate about ıtagaki, was even more dissatisfied with thenew interior minister, admiral nobumasa suetsugu. konoe had selectedsuetsugu to counter the influence of the right wing. however, the newlysworn-in suetsugu acted like the virtual spokesman of the right wing. ıt wasnot possible for the cabinet to suppress the rightists. hapless, konoe wroteto the emperor: “suetsugu is the center of trouble in the cabinet.” konoewanted to resign as a way out. he told his friend kumao harada:“people overestimated me. how could ı have become the primeminister? ıt’s just too presumptious.”the new foreign minister, kazushige ugaki, worked hard towardsforging peace with the nationalist government. he hoped to see peace talksheld before the japanese army attacked hankow. on june 26, the japaneseconsul-general in hong kong, toyoichi nakamura, sent a wire, saying thata confidant of kung hsiang-hsi wanted to meet with ugaki for possiblepeace negotiations and asked for instructions. ugaki personally drafted 24 «?????»????????directives for nakamura, telling the latter to continue negotiations andasking him to return to japan to discuss matters. ugaki decided that aftertalks had progressed, kung hsiang-hsi could secretly travel to kyushu for aface-to-face meeting with ugaki.at this point in time, the japanese government was drafting plans forthe establishment of a central body —the “ınstitute on china”(koain)—tobe subordinated under the office of the prime minister as a way to handlethe sino-japanese conflict. once established, this institute would not onlyreduce the power of the foreign minister, but also set up an office in theoccupied territory to handle local political matters. to show disapproval forthis plan, ugaki submitted his resignation on september 29. konoeexpressed surprise, not knowing the reason for the resignation. this showsthat konoe’s revamp of the cabinet was useless.ındeed, the new cabinet was getting worse each day. ıt was, therefore,no exaggeration when saionji’s secretary, harada, said “the current cabinetworks much like a federation.”faced with such a difficult situation, the konoe cabinet finallydissolved on january 4, 1939. konoe himself had the following words forhis first cabinet:ı have made a conclusion regarding my tenure as prime minister overthe last year or so: my cabinet had no support from the right or the left andhad no public opinion to rely on.since the saito cabinet, the duke of saionji has always, in principle,been opposed to the policies adopted by the military. but the cabinets,forced by the trends, had to follow a restricted middle road. this wasespecially true in the cases of the supreme command and the state affairs,which alienated each another. the bridge between them was theambiguous army minister, who himself was constantly trying to stifle thecabinet. the cabinet is itself state affairs, and is thus a very weak thingmanipulated by the supreme command. people’s lives and diplomaticpolicies have no relationship whatsoever with popular will and public fumimaro konoe and the sino-japanese war 25opinion. the military is loomed over by the hazy, illusive shadow of thesupreme command, who decides, revises and abandons at will. ı have, forseveral times, tried to learn from the army minister the real color of theshadowy military sector. ı did it, to some extent, to appease my politicalconscience and shoulder my political responsibilities. back then, ı askedugaki to take charge of the foreign ministry, hoping for a change in ourchina policy. but his china policy was altered by the military, resulting inits defeat. ın the face of the military’s attack, and in order for me to take agreater responsibility in the sino-japanese conflict, ı gradually shook offand abandoned the middle road. with public opinion behind me, ı tried mybest to suppress the ambitions of the military.today, it is impossible to suppress the military using powers resting inthe different political parties. for this reason, ı can only make the followingconclusion: only by the establishment of a people’s organization differentfrom already existing parties, one that can take root in the civilian society,and one that can support the government, can it be possible to suppress themilitary, and eventually, resolve the japan-china conflict. ı resigned withmy first cabinet with the idea of studying how to form such an organization.ıv.just when foreign minister ugaki was meeting with kung hsiang-hsiabout peace negotiations, rumors went around that sadaaki kagesa, bureauchief of the army ministry, had asked the nationalist foreign ministry’sasian affairs director, kao tsung-wu, to travel to tokyo for a secretmission with the goal of luring wang ching-wei out of hiding. konoe haddone his best about wang ching-wei, but he had no plans of asking wangto form a new government. ınstead, he hoped that wang could act as abridge in peace talks with the nationalist government.according to the accounts of akira kazami, secretary-general of thefirst konoe cabinet, if not for konoe’s work on wang, he could havetendered his resignation as early as november of 1938. kazami was askedto draft the resignation statement around the end of october. he gave it to 26 «?????»????????konoe on november 3. but the resignation was not tendered until januaryof the following year. he was waiting until wang ching-wei had fledchungking.after he stepped down, konoe became the head of the sumitsuin,then joined the cabinet of kiichiro hiranuma as minister without portfolio,an arrangement that allowed him to continue his work on wang. ıt is saidthat on june 14, 1939, konoe met with wang, who was then visiting japan,for a discussion that lasted three and a half hours. konoe started bymentioning how his father, atsumaro konoe, was concerned with the chinaissue and his relationship with sun yat-sen. wang ching-wei was so movedhe said: prince konoe is an outstanding politician. with people like him,japan faces a bright future.on july 8, 1938 at nine in the morning, konoe went to see thedirector of the asian affairs of the nationalist foreign ministry, kaotsung-wu, who arrived in japan in secret and on his own accord to betterunderstandconditions there. they talked for about an hour in konoe’sresidence. also in attendance was shigeharu matsumoto. konoe said: “mymission now is to prevent the two countries from repeating this tragedy inthe future,” he expressed disapproval of autonomy for eastern hopei. hesaid: “japan basically wants to help china. we hope to cooperate. weabsolutely have no intention to interfere with chinese sovereignty.”viewed from various perspectives, it appears that konoe had neitherimperialist ambitions nor a desire to invade china.ı have mentioned earlier that after he stepped down, konoe wanted toorganize a political party backed by popular will. he believed that only thencould the military be restrained and the sino-japanese conflict be resolved.his close associates, led by akira kazami, yorichike arima, and kisaburokisya, thus went about campaigning for the formation of the new party. ınkonoe’s mind, the ideal new government should consist of existing partiesand the newly rising political entity. realizing that konoe was a politicalheavyweight, many political parties disbanded one after another, to join the fumimaro konoe and the sino-japanese war 27bandwagon. konoe was surprised and displeased. konoe once toldkisaburo kisya:what a disaster! everybody’s calling for the formation of a new party.but ı wonder just how many of them truly see the need for a new party?our goal is to avoid direct conflict with the military. by organizing apolitical party, we hope to use political power to somehow put a check onthe military’s excesses. however, among proponents of a new party, not afew want to organize a party that has close relationship with the military orthat even advocate military rule. ıt would be quite acceptable if they wereordinary members of the parliament, but many of the new party cadresharbor the same views. ı cannot just accept them. the rightist camp isspreading rumors that konoe wants to organize a new party following thestyles of shogun politics. this morning, harada (kumao) contacted me bytelephone to tell me that these people will distribute leaflets to protest theformation of the new party in tokyo. of course, ı know that the military isbehind that. the louder our voices are, the more vehement the oppositionwill become. what ı worry about most is this—do the cadres of the newparty have enough courage to resist?konoe abhorred those who just go with the current for their ownvested interests, not for the country’s. much more those opportunists whowished to tag along with him for a possible position later on. for this reason,he became more cautious in campaigning for the new party. ın response to anewspaper article alleging that he wanted a political comeback, konoemade the following declaration through the mass media:“establishing anew political system is necessary." however, he added that it would bedeceiving the people if the establishment of such a system would merelymean the disbanding of political parties and their regrouping. he called foran awakening of the people whose organization and ideas must keep upwith the times. merely currying the favor of the militarists would bemeaningless. “ıf we have to always listen to the military, we might as wellopt for a military government.” 28 «?????»????????after his resignation, konoe was succeeded by kiichiro hiranuma(january 5, 1935), nobuyuki abe (august 30, 1939),and mitsumasayonai(january 16, 1940). on july 17, 1940, konoe was called to form acabinet for the second time.before his appointment, he expressed his views during a conferenceof elders:the new prime minister must have a thorough understanding ofmilitary affairs. he said that he himself lacked this and that he waspsychologically unprepared to accept the position. but he was laterconvinced to accept the appointment after kooichi kido, ex-prime ministerreijiro wakatsuki, kiichiro hiranuma, senjuro hayashi, keisuke okada,and the president of the private council, yoshimitsu hara, all voiced supportfor him.soon after the formation of his second cabinet, the “basic nationalpolicy outline” was passed on july 26. among others, all designationbearing theterm “teikoku” was changed into “kokoku. ”the term“hakkoichiu” started to be used. simiarly, the name “east asian neworder” was revised as “greater east asian new order.”one of the most important achievements of the second konoe cabinetwas the signing of a pact with germany and ıtaly. foreign ministeryoosuke matsuoka insisted on signing the pact for the following reasons:(1)ınsufficient understanding of the military strength of germany, (2) as away to counteract pressure from the united states and great britain, (3) foran early solution to the japanese-chinese conflict, (4) yielding to pressurefrom the army, and (5) japan needs for german support in improvingdiplomatic relations with the soviet union. matsuoka believed that the pactwith germany and ıtaly, aided by the russians, would force the americansto capitulate. but instead it resulted in a war with the americans and thebritish. on the first day of the war with the u.s., matsuoka, with tears inhis eyes, told his friend, yoshie saito:“the tripartite pact was the biggestblunder of my life."on march 30, 1940, the wang puppet regime was formally fumimaro konoe and the sino-japanese war 29established in nanking. at this time, konoe was still trying to establishcontact with the chungking administration in his hope for a peacefulnegotiation with the nationalist government. two cases in point are worksdone by sung tzu-liang and chien yung-ming, both of which ended infailure. this explains why the japanese government delayed recognition ofthe wang puppet regime for eight months.after the formation of the new konoe cabinet, an imperialheadquarters-government meeting was held on july 27 to adopt importantnational strategies that would decide the fate of japan—the main outlinesfor handling world situation and vicissitudes—whose major pointsincluded seeking a solution to the sino-japanese conflict, the southwardthrust of the empire (including the use of force ), strengthening ofcooperation with germany and ıtaly, and a rapid mending of state relationswith the soviet union.provision 1 of the main outlines says: to solve the china conflict,joint efforts by political and military means shall be adopted, includingstopping all third-country assistance to chiang. all necessary measuresshall be adopted to speedily force the chungking regime to its knees. ınother words, konoe had at this point already made the following conclusion:without mediation from the united states, solution to the chinese problemwould be nowhere in sight, for which reason he decided that it wasnecessary to start negotiating with the americans.but talks with the americans didn’t go on smoothly for a host ofreasons, including miscalculations by foreign minister matsuoka, and astrong american position. matusoka, who prided himself as the “japanesehitler,” made konoe appear helpless. matsuoka had not the slightestinkling that war was about to erupt between the germans and soviets (itstarted on june 22) and in fact, believed that “amity” between the sovietunion and the japanese, ıtalian and german bloc would dissuade theamericans from joining the war. he was for an all-out war with the unitedstates if necessary. the showa emperor, worried about a war with the 30 «?????»????????americans, suggested to the interior minister, kooichi kido, to replace theforeign minister. besides, the americans had been blaming matsuoka forthe deadlock in the americans-japanese talks. konoe, who was responsiblefor the appointment of matsuoka, and for that matter, for the fuss the latterhad created, tendered his resignation together with his cabinet on july 16,1941.v.on july 17, after a conference attended by important ministers, thejapanese emperor requested konoe to form a new cabinet. the minister ofthe navy, teijiro toyoda, took over as foreign minister. the third konoecabinet was thus formally seated on july 18.to solve the diplomatic impasse with the americans, konoe, at onepoint in time, even considered making a personal trip to the united statesfor talks with president roosevelt. he obtained approval from the navy andwas ready to send a coded telegram asking for the emperor’s permission.however, tojyo hideki, minister of the army, demanded that theamericans concede as a precondition for his approval. the americansrefused, rendering a u.s. trip by konoe impossible.on september 6, a meeting with the emperor was held to discuss the“pointers for the ımplementation of ımperial national policies.” amongother things, the meeting discussed negotiations with the americans and thebritish, and completion of war preparations before the end of october. ınother words, if diplomatic talks with the americans failed to meet japanesedemands by the middle of october, japan would be ready to declare war onthe united states, britain, and the netherlands.a day before the meeting, emperor hirohito met with prime ministerkonoe, chief of the general staff sugiyama, and chief of the navalgeneral staff osami nagano. konoe’s diary has the following records ofthis meeting: “the emperor asked chief of the general staff sugiyama:‘how much time would the army really need to resolve ajapanese-american war?’ sugiyama answered: ‘ın the south seas, three fumimaro konoe and the sino-japanese war 31months or so would be necessary.’ then the emperor asked sugiyama: ‘ırecall that you were the army minister when war with china erupted. thattime, you said that ‘one month or so would be enough to solve theconflict.’ ıt’s been four years now, and no solution is within sight. thechief of the general staff stammered and defended himself by saying thatchina has a large territory and that the original war plan could not befollowed. the emperor told him in a loud voice: ‘you say that china has alarge territory. the pacific ocean covers a much larger space. on whatbasis do you say three months?’ unable to respond, the general remainedsilent, his head bowed low….”konoe became increasingly worried about the diplomatic impassewith the americans, whose suspicions about the japanese were deep-seated.as charles beard (1874-1948) said, japan has a long record of “barbaricbehavior,” and that konoe, no different from the “bloodthirsty militarists,”wants to deceive the americans.under such circumstances, konoe summoned army minister tojyo,navy minister oikawa, foreign minister toyoda, and planning ınstitutepresident teiichi suzuki to his official residence, the tekigaiso, on october12, his birthday, for a final meeting on the fate of the war. the meetingwent on for four hours.on this occasion, the words of tojyo carried the heaviest weight andwere the most decisive.tojyo: when negotiating with the americans, we cannot give in on theissue of stationing troops (the issue of the japanese army garrisonedin china). ıf the americans do not yield on this, our negotiationswill be doomed to failure.oikawa: we are now at a crossroads. shall we decide to go to war orcontinue diplomatic talks? ıf we choose to negotiate, then we muststop preparation for war and devote ourselves fully to thenegotiations. but this must be done only if there is hope forsuccess in the negotiations. after two to three months of talks, we 32 «?????»????????cannot stop in the middle of them. ı’m in favor or letting the primeminister decide.konoe: what is the opinion of the foreign minister?toyoda: because we have an opponent, ı can’t be absolutely confident.tojyo & oikawa: ıf we delay for a long time only to regret it and opt forwar, it would bring lots of difficulties. now is the time todecidekonoe: there are risks involved either way. the question is which waybrings the greater risk. ıf we have to make a decision now, ı’dchoose to continue negotiating.tojyo: ıs the foreign minister confident? what the foreign minister has justsaid will not convince the supreme command.konoe: comparing possible results of the two, ı’d choose to negotiate.tojyo: that’s just a subjective view of the prime minister. ıt is stillunconvincing to the supreme command.oikawa: ı agree.tojyo: the prime minister does not have to make such an early conclusion.ı want to hear the view of the foreign minister.toyoda: that depends upon the conditions. now, the most difficult issue isthe stationing of troops. ıf the army minister does not give intotally, negotiation would be doomed to failure. ıf we yield a bit,there is some hope for the talk to succeed.tojyo: the stationing of troops is the very life of the army. we absolutelycannot give in on that.konoe: ıs there a way to call it by any other way? we do it on the surfacethe way the americans want it but in real terms, we continuestationing our troops as before. ın any case, ı will surely opt fordiplomatic negotiations. ıf we go to war, let it not be said that ı amresponsible for it.tojyo: didn’t we already decide to go to war if negotiations do not hold anypromise in our meeting with the emperor on september 6? you fumimaro konoe and the sino-japanese war 33were present at that meeting too, mr. prime minister. ı don’t quiteunderstand when you say you cannot be held responsible for it.konoe : what ı mean is that ı feel more confident about the negotiations. ıfyou ask me to choose something ı’m less confident about, ı cannotbe held responsible for it. the decision during that meeting wasmade on the premise that there is no hope for success in thenegotiations. ıt’s not that we see no hope in holding talks now. weare confident about it.1on september 14, before the cabinet meeting was held, konoe againsummoned tojyo. he wanted tojyo to be pragmatic enough to agree to atroop withdrawal. he told the army minister that “the conflict with chinahas dragged on for four years and japan is now on the brink of an uncertainwar” and that no matter what, he couldn’t let that happen. tojyo was firm inhis disapproval. he said that “it is a clash of personality.” the helplesskonoe told his close aides: “the army wants to wage a war that is destinedto fail. the navy is not confident and the emperor himself is against war.the army minister refuses to listen. he’s a real dumb fool.”2failing to reach a consensus with tojyo and facing the army’s demand for him to step down,konoe finally tendered his resignation on october 16, 1941, citing asreason a clash of opinion with the minister on diplomatic negotiations withthe americans. the third konoe cabinet died a natural death three monthsafter it was formed.vı.the next cabinet was formed by hideki tojyo himself. he alsoappointed himself minister of the army and minister of the interior. later,he also took the post of the chief of the general staff. this wasunprecedented in japanese history. on december 8, konoe immediatelyreturned to tokyo from hakone after hearing radio broadcasts about thedeclaration of war against the united states. he told morisada hosokawa3who was then visiting him: “ıt’s a disaster. ı have an inkling that japan willlose the war at a great expense. this temporary situation (winning withglorious victory) will last for only two to three months at most.”4as konoe predicted, japan’s victory was short-lived. since the battleof midway (june 5, 1942), the americans had gained control of the pacificwar. on june 19, 1944, saipan fell into u.s. hands. on october20, theamericans conquered leyte ısland in the philippines. then on november11, b29 bombers bombarded tokyo. on november 10, wang ching-weidied at the nagoya ımperial university hospital.konoe was received by the emperor on february 14, 1945. he told theemperor three things:(1) japan will lose the war, (2) he was afraid thatcommunism would rise after the defeat, and (3) he was worried about thereformist movement in the army.konoe had been plotting in secret with reijiro wakatsuki, keisukeokada, and kiichiro hiranuma to oust tojyo. nobuhito takamatsnomiya,brother of emperor hirohito, had once thought of getting rid of tojyo.5however, the emperor trusted tojyo,6 for which reason konoe once said:emperor hirohito was like a puppet of kido. all suggestions made to himwere divulged to kido, who, in turn, immediately informed tojyo.7 kidoand tojyo were good friends, and the latter did not want the emperor toreceive too much “noise.” this explains why, in more than three years, noteven konoe could see the emperor unaccompanied.when things turned for the worse, emperor hirohito again summonedkonoe. he was assigned to go and convince the soviet union to brokerpeace. konoe’s plane and entourage were ready to depart but the sovietunion had, by then, decided to declare war on japan. the soviets soundedevasive and didn’t directly respond to konoe’s request for a visit. on july26, the allies made the potsdam declaration. on august 6, the u.s. droppedthe first atomic bomb on hiroshima. two days later, the soviet uniondeclared war against japan. on august 15, the japanese surrenderedunconditionally.on november 22, the three-time prime minister konoe tookresponsibility for his failure to solve the sino-japanese conflict and saverelations with the united sates by making a humiliating apology.a warrant for his arrest was issued by the allied forces on december 6.konoe, respected as a prince, refused arrest. ın the early morning ofdecember 6, the day of the scheduled arrest, he committed suicide bytaking poison. he was 55.the night before his suicide, konoe talked until about two in themorning with his second son, michitaka. michitaka gave his father a penciland asked him to write down a few things. konoe jotted down what he feltat that moment:i have made many political mistakes since the chinese conflict. ı feelresponsible for them but ı cannot accept the idea of being tried as aso-called war criminal in an american court of law. ı feel especiallyresponsible for the china conflict, and its resolution was a greatest mission.--- spoiler ---
(mouse sanitary pad - 24 Mayıs 2018 05:55)
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